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The Logic of Declining Civic Participation
by Jason
In recent years scholars have focused increasing
attention on the role played by free or voluntary associations

William Beutler
A DEFlr--:ITION

or

FREE ASSOCIATIOl':

Alexis de Tocqueville's explanation of free associa-

in American society. Some of the research done on this sub-

tions remains a highly respected account of how and why

ject suggests that one form of free association, the civic asso-

these groups form in a democratic society. For this reason

ciation, is a key source of social capital: a set of norms and

many scholars return to Tocqueville to begin their discussion

shared ideals that produce a network of trust many consider

of almost any type of voluntary association (Hall 1995, 5).

essential for the success of democratic liberal society.

According to Tocqueville, free associations can be organized

Consequently, some scholars argue that civic organizations

for any conceivable purpose, but they all have one thing in

such as the Boy Scouts, bowling leagues, and the Red Cross

common: they unite "the energies of divergent minds and vig-

are an essential part of American life. However, another type

orously [direct 1them toward a clearly indicated goal" (1966,

of free association typically known as the interest group, is

190). This characteristic of free associations is apparent in

often accused of thwarting the public good in pursuit of its

both civic associations and interest groups. Both groups orga-

own, narrow interests. These interest groups have proved so

nize to purse some chosen end. Thus both interest groups

destructive that one writer has accused them of being "the

and civic associations fit the definition of a free association

silent killer of American government" (Rauch 1994, I).

given by Tocqueville.

Given the positive effects of civic associations and the prob-

The term free association itself points out one of

lems caused by interest groups, one would hope that the num-

the fundamental characteristics of these groups which is that

ber and strength of interest groups would shrink and that par-

individuals have free entrance into and exit from these associa-

ticipation in civic associations would grow conversely. In real-

tions. To illustrate this point Tocqueville compares voluntary

ity the trend is exactly opposite. New interest groups seem to

association to a game played by children who "submit to rules

appear daily in Washington while both the number of civic

settled by themselves and punish offenses that they define

groups and participation in them is declining. How then do

themselves" (1966, 189). The game analogy points out that

we explain decreased participation in civic groups and the

those involved want to participate. If the rules become to

increased energy devoted to interest groups? In this paper I

oppressive, participants are free to leave. But while involved

will argue that the expanded role of government has uninten-

in the game, they are obliged to obey the rules agreed to by all

tionally played an unfortunate and pivotal role in both the

other participants.

decline of productive civic associations needed to build social

Tocqueville points out the contrast that exists

capital and the marked increase of destructive, narrow interest

between free associations and governments which are a form

groups. To show this link, I will examine the reasons people

of permanent association. By their very permanence. even the

form free associations including civic groups and interest

most free form of government is not entirely voluntary. No

groups. I will then explain why these associations are impor-

regime can allow individuals to form a new government when-

tant in a democratic liberal society, and how an expanded role

ever they choose inside the boundaries of the old one. In con-

for government leads to a decline in civic associations and an

erast, many free associations can exist in the same boundaries

expansion of interest groups.

and share the same members while pursuing diverse ends.
Thus governments differ from free associations in that the
latter are entirely voluntary while the former are not.
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WilY CiVIC ASSOCIATIOI\S ARE IMPORTA:->T IN A DEMOCRATIC

in government affairs. In addition studies show that in soci-

SOCIETY

eties with a large amount of social capital governments typicalFree associations form to accomplish any number of

tasks from educating the youth to securing euthanasia for the

ly receive greater support from the populous (Putnam 1993).
Tocqueville provides additional insights into the

elderly, but they all have one common characteristic: these

importance of free associations for democracies by comparing

groups exist to further a collective interest of all those

democratic and aristocratic society. According to Tocqueville,

involved. If free associations are simply self-interested enti-

the need for free associations is not as great in aristocratic

ties, why then has the decline of one form of free association,

times as it is in times of equality. When aristocracy reigns,

the civic association, become a cause for concern? A large

loyalty to family and class hold people together. Since fami-

number of scholars feel that these associations not only seek

lies seldom change in station, family members typically see

to benefit their members, they also produce a positive side

themselves as part of a continuing chain, rather than a solitary

effect for society as a whole known as "social capital"

individual. 1 Consequently, individuals in aristocratic times

(Coleman 1988).

are willing to give up instant gratification for the sake of their

In a recent Journal of Democracy article,

Robert Putnam explains this capital's importance.

children and grandchildren.
In addition to family connections, aristocratic insti-

For a variety of reasons, life is easier in a communi-

tutions place each person in a class structure. From this posi-

ty blessed with a substantial stock of social capital.

tion, each member of society needs the assistance of people in

In the first place, networks of civic engagement fos-

different castes to accomplish anything. As Tocqueville

ter sturdy norms of generalized reciprocity and

explains it, "each citizen in an aristocratic society has his fixed

encourage the emergence of social trust.

sta tion, one above another, so that there is always someone

works

facilitate

coordination,

Such net-

communication,

above him whose protection he needs and someone below him

amplify reputations, and thus allow dilemmas of col-

whose help he may require" (1996, 507). This position teach-

lective action to be resolved. (Putnam 1995, 67)

es the members of society that they are part of a larger unit
without which they can do nothing. Thus when aristocracy

In other words social capital gained in civic associations is like

reigns, people are held together both by the existence of class-

a blue print that gives people the pattern and equipment need-

es and by the seeming permanence of the family's position.

ed to work together more efficiently in solving the problems

However, the institutions of family and class that

that develop in a community. Since individuals who are civi-

glue the aristocratic society together are loosened or removed

cally involved have learned to work together, they already have

under a democratic regime. Since people are neither absolute-

developed skills and habits such as mutual trust and coopera-

ly dependent on their family nor other people for their exis-

tion that are needed to surmount any new obstacle the com-

tence, they can easily become isolated from the rest of society.

munity might face.

While this withdrawal from social life is not an immediate

Although civic associations begin as a tool for indi-

danger to society as a whole, Tocqueville argues that it plants

viduals to seek their own interests, the abilities gained through

the seeds that can lead to its eventual destruction. In this iso-

these efforts take people beyond actions that arc simply for

lated condition people are easy pawns for an oppressive gov-

private benefit. In working together with others, social capital

anment, because they are not connected to a social network

is developed. Participation in a civic association results in

through which they can accomplish anything. For a tyrant

cooperation spill-overs that may serve the public good in

what better condition can there be than the isolation of all

numerous other aspects of life. For example, people who are

citizens? No group can easily combine to oppose the tyrant.

actively involved civically are morc likely to vote and participate

Thus isolation leaves the masses vulnerable to those who
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would strip them of their liberty (Tocqueville 1966, 507).
Although the isolation that results from equality

something quite similar to what modern scholarship has
begun calling social capital. Although the key descriptive

exposes people to tyranny, this oppression need not come

terms used by recent scholars such as Putnam and Coleman

from a single despot. In a democracy it comes more often

are different than those used by Tocqueville, their conclusions

from the majority. The tyranny of the majority can be Just as

about the importance of civic associations are remarkably sim-

repressive as that of the individual despot. The method of

ilar. All agree that without the positive side effects produced

oppression has simply undergone a metamorphosis. Instead

by civic associations, society as a whole suffers.

of one man controlling the reigns of society, the spirit of
many combines to constrain all to act according to the majority's whims. Tocqueville expresses his feelings toward this

SEEKING AN EXPLANATIO:--.J FOR DECLINING PARTICIPATION

Putnam, Coleman, and Tocqueville all point out the

tyranny as follows. "For myself, if I feel the hand of power

importance of free associations that produce social capital and

heavy on my brow, I am little concerned to know who it is

protect individual liberty. However, there seems to be a clear

that oppresses me; I am no better inclined to pass my head

trend towards decreased participation in these groups. Robert

under the yoke because a million men hold it for me" (1966,

Putnam makes clear that activity in associations from the Boy

436). Tyranny of the majority, then, leads to the same

Scouts to the Red Cross to bowling leagues has declined

bondage as any other form of tyranny. It still constrains indi-

steadily since the late 1960s (1995,69-70). If these associa-

vidual liberty and leaves people as the pawns of some master.

tions are crucial for successful, modern democratic society,

One way to escape tyranny (of one or the majority)
is through free associations which preserve the liberty of the

why are fewer people participating in them?
There are a number of possible explanations for

people. As individuals participate together as part of a larger

declining participation in civic associations. Putnam examines

group, one individual in that group cannot be hurt without

a few of these that seem most serious, including the move-

the entire group knowing about it. Thus the type of oppres-

ment of women into the labor force and changes in the

sion that can creep into a society of isolated individuals is less

American family. However, after careful analysis he concludes

likely to flourish in a society where many free associations

that none of these changes are a satisfactory to explain the

exist, because these groups are capable of acting collectively to

changes in civic participation. If the entrance of women into

protect their members.

the labor market was the primary cause of decreasing civic par-

Both interest groups and civic associations are capa-

ticipation, the number of women involved civically should

ble of collective action to protect participants in their groups

have declined faster than that of men, but this is not the case.

and so it seems that at as a means of preventing tyranny of

Putnam suggests that the most likely cause of decreased par-

the majority or of an individual neither type of association has

ticipation in civic groups is the privatization of leisure actual-

huge advantages over the other. However, Tocqueville makes

ly made possible by technological advances. Individuals can

clear that civic associations not only protect liberty, they also

now be entertained in their own living rooms. Technological

reinforce what he refers to as public virtue. He describes this

innovations such as TVS and VCRs have, Putnam argues,

as a reinforcement process by which "feelings and ideas are

have a heavy impact on civic involvement. (1995, 74-75)

renewed, the heart enlarged, and the understanding developed

Putnam's argument that technology's privatization

only by the reciprocal action of men one upon another"

of leisure has led to the decline of civic associations seems

(1966, 51 5). This reciprocal action of one individual on

plausible when applied to bowling leagues and bridge clubs.

another found in civic association is the primary source of

People only have a certain amount of time to spend bowling

public virtue in times of equality.

or bridging in a league with friends and neighbors, and the

Tocqueville uses the term public virtue, to describe

more of that time quota they fill at home, the less time they

JASON BEUTLER
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will have to spend in the entertainment-oriented civic groups

The displacement of civic associations by bureaucra-

in which they once participated. However, this explanation

cy in the name of efficiency is not likely to produce social

seems more limited in explaining the reduced participation in

consequences that are immediately visible, because the social

many other civic groups. Associations such as Boys Scouts,

capital built up by civic association does not dissipate instan-

the Red Cross, and organized religion do more than simply

taneously. With time, however, the repercussions of disinte-

provide leisure for their volunteers. Thus a theory of partici-

grating civic associations become more serious. Tocqueville

pation based on expendable leisure seems too limited, and a

notes that the more government expands to organize society,

more inclusive explanation is needed.

the less capable individual people will be to organize associations that solve even the smallest collective-action problems.

ADMIKISTRATIVE DESPOTISM

If Tocqueville's explanation of free association dis-

Consequently, citizens become even more dependent on government to deal with any new crisis that arises. Seeing these

cussed earlier is right, then these associations are formed and

dangers, Tocqueville asks of those who would have govern-

joined by people as a means of advancing collectively shared

ment replace civil associations:

interests. Thus a straightforward explanation for decreased
participation in these groups would be that either these inter-

Must the public administration cope with every

ests are being met in some other way or the desire to achieve

industrial undertaking beyond the competence of

the goals sought by these organizations has diminished.

one individual citizen? And if ultimately, as a result

In Tocqueville's discussion of free associations he

of the minute subdivision of landed property... must

suggests that a large, centralized bureaucracy would seriously

the head of government leave the helm of state to

undermine civic associations, since the bureaucracy would

guide the plow? (I966, 5 I 5)

essentially take over the responsibilities once performed by
voluntary groups. He names this type of government "admin-

As if to answer Tocqueville's question, the recent

istrative despotism" because, while it works to do the will of

debate over the new farm bill has shown that central govern-

the people, it also robs them of the ability to do things for

ment must in a sense guide the plow. Farmers in many parts

themselves. As government entities take the place of civic

of the country have become so dependent on government to

associations, the social capital that was once formed by partic-

tell them what and how much to plant that the extended

ipation in these organizations also diminishes (I966, 5 I 5).

debate over the farm bill has had an interesting effect.

The logic behind establishing a centralized bureau-

Without governmental guidance many farmers have conceded

cracy is that since it holds the might of government, it is the

that they would have difficulty going forward with spring

most efficient way to carry out large-scale projects that are

planting. The agriculture department has stepped into the

difficult for the people to accomplish. Since government can

role of crop management and now it literally cannot step out

tax all citizens, it can avoid the free-rider problem caused by

without leaving farmers unable to make basic decisions about

those who would otherwise enjoy services without helping to

what crops to grow. Government has taken the place that

pay for them. Recently, many scholars have argued that for

would have once been occupied by free associations

numerous reasons government agencies are not the most effec-

(Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report I995, 2I27-39).

tive means of accomplishing large-scale PCO)ccts,2 bur

Tocqueville saw this form of micro-management by

Tocqueville points out that even more important than the pos-

government as a possibility in diversified, democratic society.

sible inefficiency of an active, centralized bureaucracy is the

Instead of seeking happiness for a few members of society,

danger created by breaking down free associations that are

soft despotism seeks for the happiness of all, but it also wants

needed to produce social capital.

to define what this happiness is. Thus as this form of gov-
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ernment assumes paternal responsibility for society, it keeps

However, when experience with these more grass-root choices

its citizens in a perpetual childhood (1966, 692). While

is limited, the likelihood that people will make the bigger

bureaucratic government may preserve some form of order, it

choices properly is also diminished. When the government

destroys civil society. As Tocqueville notes, in times of equali-

makes decisions for the people which within the context of

ty "a government, by itself, is ... incapable of refreshing the cir-

civic associations could have been made by the people, the

culation of feelings and ideas among a great people" (1966,

individual's ability to make competent decisions declines. As

5 I 6). These feelings and ideas comprise the heart of public

centralized government broadens the scope of its programs,

virtue or social capital that holds the community together.

one unintended consequence is that it undercuts the ability of

Since the aristocratic sources of these public virtues-family

its citizens to make competent decisions about how govern-

and class-have already been weakened or destroyed in the

ment should be run. Thus a centralized, active bureaucracy

democratic society, a pivotal source of these virtues is civic

not only limits the freedom of individuals, it also undermines

association. When bureaucracy replaces associations, order

their ability to use their remaining liberty effectively.

may be momentarily increased, but civic society that is held
together by feelings of community is damaged. Even the

A COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM

order that is created by governmental intervention is insuffi-

The analysis thus far has shown that the growth of

cient, because, as public virtue decays, ever increasing govern-

centralized bureaucracy leads to the decline of civic associa-

ment intervention is needed. Each new intervention leads to

tions.

calls for further governmental action.

because they help preserve individual liberty and produce

Administrative despotism does not break the will of

These associations are an important part of society,

social capital. Using the language of economics this capital

individuals, but this form of oppression can weaken it. Instead

could be described as a "positive externality" of ciVIC aSSOCla··

of recognizing public problems and working to solve them,

tions, because the benefits from social capital can be felt not

individuals become hard working animals that are directed by

only by those who participate in these groups, but also by the

the state. Some room for free will still exists, but this space is

rest of society as a whole. However, since the 1960s a new

decreased. And the choices individuals under administrative

set of free associations has come to prominence: interest

despotism are allowed to make are strange ones. Tocqueville

groups. These groups, like civic associations, organize volun-

summarizes this paradox as follows: "Under this system the

tarily to pursue some collective end, but unlike Tocquevillean

citizens quit their state of dependence just long enough to

civic associations, interest groups produce "negative external-

choose their masters and then fall back into it" (1966, 693).

ities" by securing some good for themselves at the rest of

Individuals are still oppressed, but they are allowed
to choose those who oppress them. Yet, how competent are

society's expense.
While civic associations have been declining rapidly

humans in this condition of choosing their leaders? Some

during the last thirty years, interest groups have grown at an

scholars have pointed out that there is a direct correlation

alarming rate. Purnam explains that one important difference

between the strength of civic associations and the effective-

between interest groups and civic associations is that interest

ness of government. Robert Putnam notes that since the

groups require very little involvement from their members.

1960s voting, attendance of town meetings, and even the pub-

Most members never attend a group meeting or meet a leader

lie's trust of government has decreased (I 99 5, 69). Over this

of the organization, and they typically make their entire con-

same period of time the size and power of government has

tribution to the organization by writing a check (Putnam

expanded, taking over much of the work once performed by

1995,71). Certainly, this form of interaction is not likely to

voluntary associations. Logically, the small choices made in

develop the social connectedness and sense of trust that are a

civic associations prepare people to make bigger ones.

natural byproduct of civic associations.

JASON BEUTLER
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the costs of obtaining them (Olson 1965, I I - 15). Hence the

this new form of free association is that it feeds off the

interest groups that develop to lobby government tend to cen-

expanded role of centralized government. Centralized bureau-

ter around narrow interests that benefit a select few.

cracy not only puts in place new programs that replace civic

Any developing interest group faces an uphill organi-

associations thus damaging the organizations that help create

zational battle, trying to find people willing to donate suffi-

social capital, the expanded role of government also opens up

cient resources to make the group viable. But Olson notes

a new way for groups to seek collective ends. Instead of orga-

that once these groups are formed, they seldom disappear.

nizing along broad goals that encourage large scale private

Consequently, these narrow interest groups tend to build up

support for an organization's activities, interest groups use

over time.

the expanded powers of government to redistribute the wealth

resources, more and more of a society's productive energies

of society for their own benefit. In other words these groups

are sucked into the fight to redistribute already existing

bypass the general public and instead appeal to a small group

resources rather than producing more for everyone. These

of bureaucrats and government officials for resources to pur-

groups find it easier to get the government to redistribute

sue their chosen ends.

wealth in their favor than it is to produce more and to pro-

As interest groups compete for government

duce it more efficiently. Thus, the incentive ro produce new
WHY JOINING AN INTEREST GROUP MAKES SENSE

Although the lobbying efforts of most interest
groups are seen by many as being underhanded and even sinis-

goods is diminished, while the incentive to seek a larger share
of what is already produced increases (Olson 1982).
While the pluralist theory of government maintains

ter, on closer examination it becomes clear that these efforts

that the growth of diverse interest groups is good, because

are simply the most efficient way to pursue a desired end.

these groups counter each other and approximate the public

Since the government has extensive powers and can easily

good (Burns et al. 1993, 252), there are some major problems

divert funds from society as a whole, it is more efficient to

with this theory. As Olson makes clear, it is the narrow inter-

organize a group of people with a narrow interest and use gov-

est groups that have the organizational advantage. As the

ernment as a redistributive vehicle than it is to organize a

number of groups continues to grow, only on rare occasions

group that appeals to a broad public interest and ask for pri-

do groups arise to specifically counter many of the narrow

vate support. Creating a large group that pursues these same

interests. For example, the mohair growers

aims by seeking support from the general public (in the man-

successful for years in securing a subsidy for raising mohair

ner that civic associations gain their support) is harder and

sheep) are not likely to run into the league of anti-mohair

more time consuming. Thus the expanded powers of a cen-

growers, since almost no one except those who grow mohair

tralized government make it the perfect tool for any end-seek-

know what it is, or why the government began subsidizing its

ing organization.

growth in the first place (Rauch 1994). Additionally, the

Mancur Olson best explains the problem caused by

(rt group that was

gains made by narrow interest groups like the mohair growers

interest groups in The Logic oj Collective Action. To explain why

is much larger than the expected gains of any group counter-

interest group lobbying creates problems for the political sys-

ing their efforts. A tax payer would likely save only a few

tem, Olson notes that smaller groups motivated by narrow

tenths of a penny by stopping the mohair subsidy, but the

interests have a tremendous advantage in the interest group

members of this narrowly organiLed group profit handsomely

organization game over large groups with broad interests.

by even a small subsidy since their are not many of them.

Broad interest groups are vulnerable to the free rider problem

Thus as Mancur Olson makes clear, it is the small groups with

witnessed with public goods. This free rider problem can be

narrow interests that have nothing to lose and everything to

best summarized as individuals gaining benefits without paying

gain in transfer-seeking activities

(I 96 5, 33 - 38).
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One possible counter argument that could be made to

bureaucratic agencies cannot produce social capital, the recipro-

support pluralist theory is that public-interest gtoups stand up

cal feeling and habits of cooperation that lead people to work

for the general public by countering activities of other organiza-

together and effectively achieve collective ends. These feelings

tions. But actually public interest gtoupS do not break ftom the

and habits are a natural side effect of civic participation. The

interest gtoup paradigm established by Olson; rather they enrich

second negative consequence of governmental expansion is that

it. Public-interest gtoupS want, in principle, the same thing as all

it is often more efficient for individuals to create narrow inter-

other interest groups: benefits at someone else's expense. These

est groups that seek to divert government resources than it is

groups claim their projects benefit the general public, but their

to form civic associations that can accomplish these same pur-

ideas are seldom embraced by a majority of Americans. Nor do

poses. Thus the energies that might otherwise go into orga-

public-interest groups try to achieve broad-based support before

nizing and maintaining civic associations are diverted into par-

moving ahead with an agenda. Like every other interest group,

asitic, transfer-seeking activities.

public-interest groups attempt to create new programs by appealing to a narrow range of legislators and bureaucrats.

These

groups like others involved in lobbying are typically centered

CONCLUSION

In this paper I have argued that governmental expan-

around an agenda that appeals to only a narrow segment of citi-

sion both displaces civic associations and produces greater

zens while asking tax payers as a whole to pay for the programs

incentives for interest groups to use government as a means of

these groups recommend. Although these groups use the term

redistributing resources. Clearly, the increased bureaucratic

"public interest" to describe themselves, they seek to transfer

centralization of government has not developed as a way to

resources in the same manner as every other interest group with-

supplant civic associations with a feeding frenzy of interest

out gaining large scale public support (Rauch 1994,45-47).

groups, but this has been one of the unanticipated side effects.
This paper is not an attempt to argue that government action

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

The proliferation of transfer-seeking interest groups

is never justified, but rather to make clear the dangers of using
government as the primary solution to every collective-action

by itself is a dangerous problem for any society. And the

dilemma. Attempts by government to stop the decline of civic

accompanying decline in civic associations that are needed to

associations and the rise of interest groups through further

build social capital is an equal, if not greater cause for concern.

expansion of governmental power are likely to be counterpro-

Both of these problems can best be described as an unintended

ductive. An effective solution must limit government action in

consequence of expanding governmental powers. Certainly, the

some consistent manner so that interest groups have fewer rea-

government is not the only agent that has contributed to these

sons to invest in governmental lobbying efforts and more

disturbing trends.

incentive to ask for broad-based private support.

However, its growth is a primary source of

The conse-

both the increased energy devoted to transfer seeking and

quence of further governmental expansion is likely to be that

decreased civic participation. As long as government is avail-

civic associations will continue to decline and social capital

able as an easy quick fix to every problem, people are more like-

needed for the wise direction of governmental efforts will

ly to ask for a government solution than to participate in civic

diminish. It is also likely that these unfortunate processes will

associations that can accomplish the same tasks. Thus the

be fed by the growth of narrow interest groups that produce

expanded powers of government have a two-fold negative effect

negative externalities as they bypass the general public good,

on society as a whole. First, as government does the jobs that

appeal to a small group of government officials for access to

civic association once did, the amount of social capital

the public purse, and draw more of society's productive

declines. It is unclear whether government does these jobs

resources into counter-defensive maneuvers that seem necessary

more successfully than civic associations, but it is clear that

to survive the consequences of redistributive politics.

JASON BEUTLER
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